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ARGUMENT 
The core issue presented in this case is whether a 
municipality must comply with its own ordinances. Draper City (the 
"City") has enacted an ordinance which provides that an appeal from 
a decision of the Planning Commission "shall be filed in writing 
with the City Recorder within fourteen (14) days of the Planning 
Commission's decision." (emphasis added) The City argues that the 
word "shall," as used in the ordinance, does not really mean shall, 
but that it is merely a suggested time frame for taking an appeal. 
As discussed fully below, Utah law quite correctly holds just the 
opposite: "Shall" means shall. Accordingly, under Utah law, the 
failure of a party to timely file an appeal in compliance with the 
jurisdictional mandate is fatal to that party's right to appeal. 
This jurisdictional issue is dispositive and the decision of the 
district court should be reversed on this ground. 
Even if the Court determines that the jurisdictional issue is 
not dispositive, fundamental principles of administrative review 
dictate reversal. The City has enacted a Hillside Ordinance which 
prohibits construction on slopes in excess of 3 0%. The ordinance, 
however, also permits an exception to that prohibition if certain 
enumerated criteria are satisfied. In this case, the Draper City 
Council completely ignored its own ordinance and reversed the 
Planning Commission's approval of the Owners' construction. The 
City Council based its decision on grounds other than those set 
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forth in the ordinance. As such, the City Council's decision was 
arbitrary and capricious. 
The City's entire argument is based on the notion that the 
Owners made material misrepresentations to the Planning Commission. 
The Owners readily acknowledge that, based on incorrect information 
received by the Owners, they stated their belief to the Planning 
Commission that there was no opposition to the project from 
neighboring landowners.1 That information later turned out to be 
inaccurate. However, it is clear that the misrepresentation, to 
the extent that there was any, was immaterial to the Planning 
Commission's decision approving the project. Accordingly, the 
City's argument, rather than providing a substantive legal basis 
for decision, is little more than an inflammatory diversion. The 
district court erroneously upheld the decision of the City Council 
and the Owners respectfully request that this Court reverse that 
decision. 
I. THE CITY COUNCIL LACKED JURISDICTION TO HEAR APPEAL FROM THE 
PLANNING COMMISSIONS APRIL 20, 1995 DECISION, 
It is undisputed that the objecting parties failed to appeal 
the Draper Planning Commission's April 20, 1995, decision within 
xThe Owners simply had no knowledge of the purported 
opposition. Indeed, the District Court expressly found that the 
Owners' representation of their belief regarding the lack of 
opposition was not knowingly false or made in bad faith. 
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fourteen days, as required by City Ordinance.2 The City 
acknowledges as much in its Brief. The City, however, citing a 
1957 New Hampshire case, argues that the 14-day appeal requirement 
is advisory, not jurisdictional.3 While such may have been the law 
in New Hampshire, it is not currently the law in Utah. Indeed, 
controlling authority from the Utah Supreme Court is dispositive. 
In Herr v. Salt Lake County, 525 P.2d 728 (Utah 1974), the 
Utah Supreme Court addressed whether the word "shall," as used in 
a county ordinance, was jurisdictional or advisory. The ordinance 
at issue in Herr provided: 
The Board of County Commissioners, after proper review of the 
decision of the Planning Commission, may affirm, reverse, 
alter or remand for further review and consideration any 
2Appellee incorrectly cites Draper City Ordinance 9-6-050 as 
controlling. Section 9-6-050 provides for appeal of certain issues 
decided by the Planning Commission to the Draper City Board of 
Adjustment. The section also provides, however, that "certain 
zoning matters including conditional use permits and subdivisions 
shall be appealed to the City Council as designated by the City." 
Id. Because the instant litigation involves an issue subject to 
direct appeal to the City Council, Section 6-1-4 of the Draper City 
Ordinances controls. 
3Aside from the plain inapplicability of New Hampshire case 
law to this Court's decision, the case cited by Appellee does not 
stand for the stated proposition. Contrary to Appellee's 
representation that "an objecting party could not be bound by a 
lack of notice," Opp. Br. at 11, the court in Duma is upheld the 
district court's finding that the complainant had complied with the 
ten-day appeal requirement because he had registered his protest 
with the clerk of the zoning board. Dumais v. Somersworth, 134 
A. 2d 700, 702 (N.H. 1957) ("The building inspector was clerk of the 
zoning board and the evidence warranted a finding that Barry made 
his complaint within ten days of issuance of the permit."). 
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action taken by said Planning the Commission and shall make 
such decision in seven (7) days of the hearing of the appeal. 
Id. at 729 (emphasis in original). The Board of County 
Commissioners had taken eleven days to render its decision, rather 
than the seven days set forth in the ordinance. In holding that 
the Board's delay resulted in a loss of jurisdiction, the Court 
concluded that the use of the mandatory shall was jurisdictional, 
not advisory: "We think the County Commission should abide by its 
own ordinance which says it shall make its decision within seven 
days after hearing, and if it fails so to do, it loses its 
jurisdiction in the matter." Id. (emphasis in original).4 
The court in Herr cited the prior case of Lund v. Cottonwood 
Meadows Co. , 392 P.2d 40 (1964) for the underlying rationale of its 
decision. In Lund, a developer planned to construct a mobile home 
park. A citizens' group opposed to the development failed to 
appeal the Planning Commission's approval of the project within the 
ninety-day appeal period.5 The court reasoned that "[t]he 90-day 
limitation of Sec. 17-27-16 is designed to assure speedy appeal to 
4The dissent noted that courts have drawn a distinction 
between time limitations placed upon the parties, as opposed to the 
tribunal. He rr, 525 P.2d at 729-30. Presumably, therefore, even 
the dissent would have found a parties' failure to timely appeal a 
decision as jurisdictional. 
5The ordinance provided that "An appeal of the Board of 
Adjustments must be taken within ninety (90) days after the cause 
arises or the appeal will not be considered by the Board of 
Adjustments." Lund, 392 P.2d at 42 n.l. 
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the proper tribunal any grievance that a party may have who is 
adversed by a decision of an administrative agency. The evident 
purpose of the statute is to assure the expeditious and orderly 
development of a community." Id. at 42. 
In this case, Draper City Ordinance 6-1-4 is mandatory, not 
advisory. It provides that an appeal to the City Council "shall be 
filed in writing with the City Recorder within fourteen (14) days 
of the Planning Commission's decision." The ordinance, like that 
at issue in Lund, plainly furthers the goals of expeditious and 
orderly development as well as finality. It is not, as the City 
argues, merely a recommendation. It is jurisdictional. 
The law in Utah is clear that the failure of a party to 
challenge the action of an administrative body within the 
prescribed time limit constitutes a waiver of that party's ability 
to do so in the future. This is so regardless of the policy 
concerns, regardless of the equities. On this basis alone, 
reversal is required. 
Moreover, even if consideration beyond the jurisdictional 
defect were appropriate, strong policy and equitable considerations 
support such a conclusion in this case. As the Appellee points 
out, Draper currently is experiencing unprecedented growth. It is 
for that precise reason that parties must comply strictly with 
ordinances intended to facilitate expeditious and orderly 
development. Restricting the length of time that the status of a 
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project is in question certainly furthers that policy. If parties 
are permitted to challenge Planning Commission decisions outside of 
the time frame set forth in the ordinance, the goals of orderly and 
expeditious development will be defeated. 
Failure to adhere to the jurisdictional bar would be 
especially inequitable in this case. The Owners have expended well 
in excess of $100,000 developing the property, based upon their 
reasonable belief that the decision rendered by the Planning 
Commission approving the development had become final. To permit 
disgruntled landowners, whose standing to challenge the 
Commission's decision is tenuous at best, to thwart the development 
at this late date is simply unfair. 
II. THE OWNERS1 RIGHT TO CONSTRUCT VESTED ONCE THE PLANNING 
COMMISSIONS DECISION BECAME FINAL. 
As noted in Appellant's opening brief, the Owners obtained a 
building permit and Planning Commission approval to construct on 
the upper portion of lot 3 04. As of May 4, 1996 (14 days following 
the Planning Commission's decision), the Owners right to proceed 
with the proposed construction vested. The City dedicates 
considerable argument to the notion that the Owners did not obtain 
a vested right because of misrepresentation to the Planning 
Commission. That argument, and the cases cited in support thereof, 
are factually misleading and legally incorrect. 
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In P.P. Corp. v. Lewis, 373 So. 2d 929 (Fla. Ct. App. 1979), 
a case cited by the City, the Florida Court of Appeals upheld the 
revocation of a building permit. However, the basis for the 
court's ruling was that the plans and specifications submitted for 
the project had not been signed by the engineers who prepared them. 
Instead, the plans had been signed by another engineer, in 
violation of state law. Id. at 930. 
In the present case, the Owners have at all times been quite 
candid regarding their planned development of the property. They 
have recognized that the Hillside Ordinance would prohibit the 
proposed construction and--initially as a condition to purchasing 
the lot--they sought a variance.6 The "misrepresentation" that the 
City refers to is not of the sort at issue in 0.P Corp. There is 
no claim of misrepresentation of the project, or the 
specifications. Rather, the City points to the representation the 
Owners made to the Planning Commission that there was no longer any 
opposition to the construction from the neighboring property 
owners. This "misrepresentation," however, was neither material, 
nor was it made in bad faith. 
6In fact, the Owners conditioned their purchase of the 
property upon approval by the City and the City's issuance of a 
building permit which the City later revoked. The Owners would 
never have purchased the property without the City's issuance of a 
building permit. 
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The March 29, 1995 letter written by Mr. Brendle to the Draper 
City Manager, seeking a new hearing on the proposal, does state 
that there "is no opposition to the project." As it turns out, 
that statement was inaccurate because, unbeknownst to Mr. Brendle, 
some neighbors did oppose the planned construction.7 
Significantly, however, that was not the only basis upon which Mr. 
Brendle sought review as the City would have the Court believe. He 
also stated that "the entire City Staff are in favor of he [sic] 
new location, all believe it to be a more functional and improved 
plan and that no harm will result. The developer concurs with the 
location at the top as better and less harmful." 
There is nothing in the record establishing that the only 
basis upon which the Planning Commission agreed to rehear the case 
was the Owners' representation that there was no opposition to the 
project. Indeed, the fact that the Planning Commission 
subsequently approved the Owners' proposal at the June 8 meeting--
even with the knowledge of the neighbors' opposition--undercuts the 
City's argument that the Commission's approval was founded upon 
misinformation. In short, the City's attempt to make this into a 
case in which approvals were obtained through material 
misrepresentation is simply a transparent argument that this Court 
should disregard. 
7The district court found, however, that the misrepresentation 
was not made in bad faith. 
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In short, Western Land Equities v. Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 
1980) is controlling authority. Under Western Lands, when the time 
for appeal of the Planning Commission's decision ran--on May 4, 
1995--Owners' right to proceed with their construction vested. 
Accordingly, they may not be divested of that right without due 
process of law. 
III. DRAPER CITY SHOULD BE EQUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM HALTING OWNERS' 
USE AND ENJOYMENT OF THEIR LAND. 
In arguing that equitable estoppel is inapplicable in this 
case the City relies solely upon the "misrepresentation" theory. 
The City's attack on the Owners' argument of equitable estoppel 
must, therefore, rise or fall on the validity of its 
misrepresentation theory. Again, however, the subsequent action of 
the Planning Commission in approving the project after becoming 
aware of the neighbors' opposition belies the City's conclusion. 
The Planning Commission minutes of the June 8, 1995 meeting 
reflect the basis for the Commission's decision. Contrary to the 
argument of the City, the commissioners were not swayed one way or 
the other by the opposition of the neighbors. Commissioner Richins 
stated that he changed his original vote against the project to a 
vote in favor of the project because "the upper location was the 
best location for the home." Paul Glauser said from a technical 
standpoint the top location is better, but that is not the only 
consideration." Similarly, Commissioner Jones stated that "the 
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Planning Commission should not be dealing with the issue of views 
but only with the suitability of building." Commissioner Howlett 
agreed that "the Planning Commission cannot guarantee views." 
These sentiments do not reflect a view that the Commission had been 
misled or that it never would have approved the construction had it 
had the "real" facts in front of it. To the contrary, these 
statements reflect the view of a majority of the Commission that 
the issue of the neighbors' concern, though marginally relevant, 
was in no way controlling. Accordingly, the fact that the Owners 
initially incorrectly stated to the Commission that the neighbors 
were not opposed to the construction is immaterial. The Owners did 
not, therefore, come before the court with unclean hands and the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel should apply. See Celebrity Club, 
Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689, 694-95 (Utah 
1979) . 
IV. OWNERS HAVE BEEN DEPRIVED OF PROPERTY WITHOUT JUST 
COMPENSATION IN VIOLATION OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONS. 
Appellees argue that Owners' takings claims are premature 
because the district court has not yet completed its 
"Administrative Review." This argument is specious. Judicial 
review of a final agency decision is not a part of the 
administrative review process. See Utah Bankers Ass'n v. America 
First Credit Union, 912 P.2d 988, 993 (Utah 1996)." Thus, the 
takings issue was properly before the district court. 
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Citing a tort case, State v. Bellonio, 911 P. 2d 1294 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996) , the City next argues that the Owners' takings claim is 
barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act because the Owners 
failed to file a Notice of Claim. Regardless of what the law may 
be with respect to torts, the Utah Supreme Court has explicitly 
declined to rule on the applicability of the notice requirement of 
the Governmental Immunities Act as applied to takings or damage to 
property claims. Bennett v. Bow Valley Dev. Co. , 797 P. 2d 419, 424 
(Utah 1990) . Thus, the fact that the Owners have not filed a 
Notice of Claim with Draper City does not bar the instant action. 
The City next argues the facts, claiming that the City's 
action has not resulted in "complete destruction, confiscation, or 
deprivation." Opp. Br. at 21. This argument not only misstates 
the applicable standard, but it also misapprehends the issue. 
In Coleman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990) , 
the Utah Supreme Court defined a "taking" as "any substantial 
interference with private property which destroys or materially 
lessens its value, or by which the owners right to its use and 
enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed." Id. 
at 626. Nothing in the Court's definition requires "complete 
destruction" as the City claims. 
The City's argument also misapprehends the real issue before 
this court. Without citing to record evidence, the City makes the 
bold assertion that the interference in this case does not rise to 
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the level of a taking. The City claims that " [t]he Lot in question 
is still buildable in the lower portion, " and that "the Lot is 
still capable of supporting a residence on the lower portion." 
Appellees' Br. at 21 & n.3. However, the court below made no 
findings relative to the takings issue. The City's bald assertions 
are insufficient to uphold the district court's ruling. At a 
minimum, the case should be remanded for findings regarding the 
takings issue. 
V, THE OWNERS7 CLAIMS THAT THE CITY ACTED IN AN ILLEGAL, 
ARBITRARY, AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER ARE NOT RES JUDICATA. 
In Section VI of its opposition brief, the City states that 
the district court determined the Owners' claims to be barred by 
the doctrine of res judicata. Nowhere in the district court's 
ruling, however, is such a conclusion stated. One can only surmise 
that the City reads the court's factual finding taking judicial 
notice of the prior proceeding before Judge Stirba as a statement 
of res judicata. Such a reading is unorthodox at best. 
In any event, the doctrine of res judicata clearly does not 
apply to the instant litigation. The Owners have a separate cause 
of action than that litigated in the previous case. The Owners are 
challenging the action of the Draper City Council taken on June 13, 
1995. The prior litigation involved the Council's August 23, 1994 
decision. 
brendle\repl-brf.hm 12 
New issues are presented in this litigation that were not 
presented in the prior suit. While the subject matter of the 
litigation is related, that has never been the basis for holding a 
suit barred on res judicata principles. The fact remains that the 
City Council action at issue here took place on June 13, 1995, 
while the Council action challenged in the prior suit took place on 
August 23, 1994. The issue presented here--the Council's June 13, 
1995 action--simply could not have been litigated previously. As 
such, even the most liberal application of the res judicata 
doctrine does not bar the Owners' claims. 
VI. THE COUNCILS REVERSAL OF THE PLANNING COMMISSION'S APPROVAL 
WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND ILLEGAL. 
The City of Draper has created a Planning Commission, the 
powers of which include the " [p]reparation of a master plan as a 
general guide for community growth and development." Draper City 
Ord. § 6-1-2 (A) . The City has enacted an ordinance which prohibits 
construction on slopes greater than 30%. However, the City also 
has carved out an exception to that prohibition. The Draper 
Hillside Ordinance identifies three, and only three, criteria to be 
applied when a party seeks to build on a slope in excess of 30%. 
See Appellant's Br. at 31. When an applicant seeks to build on a 
slope in excess of 3 0%, it is the duty of the Planning Commission 
in the first instance to review the application and determine 
whether the criteria for deviating from the general rule have been 
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satisfied. The decision of that body may be appealed to the City 
Council if timely application is made. 
In this case, the Planning Commission approved the Owners' 
application to build on Lot 304. Thus, a presumption arises that 
the criteria set forth in the Hillside Ordinance for construction 
on slopes greater than 30% were satisfied. The City Council then 
reversed the decision of the Planning Commission. The City 
Council's reversal was arbitrary and capricious unless the decision 
was based on a finding that: 
(1) the project would cause significant harm; 
(2) the proposed modification would not result in a more 
functional and improved plan; or 
(3) the developer/builder refused to comply with any 
conditions and requirements imposed by the Planning 
Commission to mitigate the adverse effects which may 
result from the proposed modification. 
See Draper City Ordinance § 9-15-4(a) [Ex. 7.] 
As the City plainly admits in its Brief, the City Council's 
reasoning for reversing the Planning Commission's ruling was not 
based upon any of these factors. Instead, it was based upon a 
"desire to remain consistent with the stated policy of preventing 
building on 30% slopes." Appellee's Br. at 25. Such a desire, 
notes the City, is "obviously rational and legally justified in 
view of the City's remarkable growth and the potential for similar 
requests in the future." 
Owners do not dispute the City's contention. The goal of 
consistency would be furthered by disallowing any construction on 
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slopes greater than 3 0%.8 Had the City of Draper elected to enact 
such a strict ordinance without exception, the parties would not 
presently be before the Court. However, the fact remains that City 
of Draper has carved out an exception to the prohibition and it has 
established guidelines for determining when construction on slopes 
in excess of 30% will be permitted. Having created such 
guidelines, the City is bound to apply them fairly and to 
articulate the factual basis for its decisions disallowing such 
development. This is especially true where, as here, the body 
empowered by ordinance to oversee planning and development has 
already given its approval to a project. 
It is important for this Court to recognize that the issue is 
not whether the City Council's decision furthers its unwritten goal 
of "consistency" or whether the City seeks to avoid setting a 
precedent. The issue is whether, having established criteria for 
evaluating applications to construct on slopes greater than 30%, 
the City Council is then free to disregard that criteria, adopt new 
criteria, and reverse the decision of the body it has empowered to 
make such decisions, without so much as setting forth the factual 
basis for its decision. 
8Owners also acknowledge that, as with any exception to a 
rule, every time the exception is made, it further strengthens 
precedent for future applicants. 
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A reviewing court is charged with ensuring that the 
administrative agency, or, as in this case, the municipal body, has 
considered relevant facts and applied the relevant criteria adopted 
by the municipal body to those facts in a principled manner. Cf. 
Adams v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 821 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991) . Thus, it is of no consequence in the present case 
whether the City's decision was "rational" or "legally justified." 
It makes no difference whether the goals of the City in consistency 
and to avoid precedent are worthy. What matters is whether the 
district court was able to review the City's action, based on the 
record before it, and conclude that the City considered the 
relevant factors and applied the stated criteria. The failure of 
a trial court to make adequate findings is reversible error. Acton 
v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) . So too, the failure of 
a municipal body to articulate facts in support of its decision 
renders the decision arbitrary and capricious. See id. In this 
case, the record simply does not support the City Council's 
decision. 
As the City notes in its brief, the City's action was not 
premised upon a finding of "significant harm,"9 it was premised 
9As an afterthought, the City argues that the impact on 
neighboring properties constitutes "significant harm." Such a 
finding appears nowhere in the City Council minutes, however. In 
any event, there is no evidence in the record supporting such a 
claim. There is no evidence which demonstrates why an impact on 
neighboring views is significant, or what the cost is, or how that 
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upon a desire for "consistency." This admission alone demonstrates 
that the City failed to apply the criteria set forth in the 
Hillside Ordinance. Accordingly, the district court's conclusion 
that the City Council's decision was not arbitrary and capricious 
should be reversed. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DISMISSED THE FACT THAT OWNERS DID 
NOT ACT IN BAD FAITH. 
The City misapprehends the import of the authority cited in 
Appellants' opening brief. The Owners do not contend that the 
absence of bad faith is dispositive. Rather, the point is that the 
trial court found specifically that the Owners did not act in bad 
faith, they did not consciously try to mislead the Planning 
Commission. Thus, the mutual mistake recognized by the district 
court was truly that--mutual. As such, the doctrine of unclean 
hands is inapplicable and the court should have gone on to consider 
the issue of equitable estoppel. The court's failure to do so was 
an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Owners respectfully request that 
this Court REVERSE and, if appropriate, REMAND the case to the 
district court. 
impact may adversely affect future development. In short, there 
simply is no factual basis supporting a "significant harm" 
argument. 
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